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Presently, increased Coast Guard Arctic operations are being driven by offshore oil development. These operations require the Coast Guard to shift resources from other priorities and risks elsewhere in the maritime domain. This paper recommends improved alignment between the costs and benefits of future Coast Guard Arctic operations. It evaluates alternative funding options for policymakers to consider in support of a Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, recommending one for further exploration. It concludes that better cost-alignment would strengthen the Strategy; further, it could accelerate the development of an Arctic maritime infrastructure, which may serve as a prudent hedge to DoD's own conservative Arctic investment strategy.
Evaluating Cost-alignment Alternatives in Support of a Coast Guard Arctic Strategy

Background
In September 2012, the National Snow and Ice Data Center recorded the smallest volume and coverage of ice in the Arctic Ocean in the 33 years since satellites have been used to measure it. 1 The rate of ice decline indicates that, by 2040, the Arctic Ocean may be completely ice-free during parts of the year. 2 The liquid portion of the Arctic is growing. This is transforming the region by inviting increased human activity, thereby creating opportunities and challenges for Arctic nations.
The United States is one of the world's eight Arctic nations. It defines the U.S.
Arctic as all U.S. territory north of the Arctic Circle. 3 Thus, the U.S. Arctic is the northern third of Alaska and its offshore waters. These waters include U.S. territorial seas which extend 12 miles off Alaska's coast, and an economic exclusive zone which extends 200 miles. In this zone, the U.S. owns all rights to ocean and seabed resources. U.S. Arctic waters are commonly known as the Bering Strait to Alaska's west, the Chukchi Sea to the northwest, and Beaufort Sea to the northeast. The mention of disputes in the region is meant to include disputes over resource claims. Arctic waters may hold over 13% and 30%, respectively, of the world's undiscovered oil and gas reserves. 5 While experts believe that the majority of these energy resources reside in locations of undisputed ownership 6 , the potential for disputed claims will remain a reason that the United States will require the ability to project a sovereign maritime presence in the Arctic. Russia has already made a bold extended continental shelf claim that extends to the North Pole. 7 Rising and resource-hungry China is also interested in the Arctic; it is not an Arctic nation, but may be formulating an
Arctic policy through which it will seek to pursue energy opportunities. 8 Congress is likewise aware of the strategic importance of the transforming Arctic.
In 2010, it asked DoD for an assessment of U.S. Arctic strategic objectives, capabilities, assets, and infrastructure. 9 In its May 2011 reply to Congress, DoD noted areas where future capability investments would be required as the Arctic transforms. 10 These areas include command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); ice-capable vessels; and shore-based infrastructure. DoD 3 also reported that its current capabilities were adequate for meeting defense needs out to the mid-term (2020-2030). The conclusion of DoD's response to Congress was that, with other budget priorities looming, it was too soon to increase spending in the Arctic:
"further evaluation of the future operating environment is required before entertaining significant investment in infrastructure or capabilities." 11 One factor in balancing the risk of over-investment, noted DoD's report, is the uncertainty in the growth of human activity in the Arctic.
The U.S. Coast Guard, for its part, has already begun to see an increase in Arctic human activity related to its missions and responsibilities. In the fall of 2012, Shell Oil conducted the first exploration drilling in offshore U.S. Arctic waters in 20 years. 12 The drilling took place in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off Alaska's remote north coast. Arctic routes that pass close to U.S. shores, but these routes will not become economically viable for most shippers for years. 16 Fish stocks may migrate into warming U.S. Arctic waters, which would require a Coast Guard presence whether or not commercial fishing will be allowed -but this is not happening yet. Two more oil companies will join Shell in U.S. Arctic waters in the next few years. 17 If exploration efforts are successful, the oil industry may greatly expand operations, increasing its dominant share of activity in U.S Arctic waters, and, correspondingly -the reason for the Coast Guard to be there with more cutters and aircraft than it employed before 2012.
An optimal Coast Guard Arctic Strategy would properly align costs and benefits, and would do so in an appropriately time-phased manner. The preceding paragraph suggests that, currently, the oil industry disproportionately drives, and thereby benefits from, the increase in Coast Guard operational presence that began in 2012. This benefit, as it pertains to oil exploration, is conferred rather narrowly: it lands first on the oil industry, whose drilling is enabled by it. The benefit also lands on the U.S. public (and particularly Alaskans), who theoretically gain a somewhat lower risk of environmental damage should a spill occur while the Coast Guard is already nearby.
Benefit spreads more broadly to the international public after the oil enters the marketplace in the form of more plentiful energy. The U.S. Treasury also reaps the benefits of resource royalty payments once production begins. There are many ways to consider the benefits of having an increased Coast Guard operational presence during Arctic drilling, but it is difficult not to conclude that the oil industry is the primary beneficiary. Significant to this discussion is the fact that the industry is a private interest.
Both private and public interests will drive future human activity and government expenditure in the Arctic. Accordingly, such interests contribute to the cost components of a Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. Examining these components is the first step in crafting an appropriate cost-alignment scheme useful to improving the Strategy. Figure   1 , on the next page, describes several possible cost components. In the near-term, private interests (oil companies) dominate as the driver for increased Coast Guard operations and investment. However, over time, it would be expected that the weight of the benefits would shift to the general public as security and other public concerns pick up importance in the Arctic. This would be the case if China or Russia began to assert itself more in the region (whether for resources or for other interests), if other nations started to encroach upon fishery resources that migrate into U.S. Arctic waters, or as maritime commercial or recreational traffic increased significantly enough to warrant its own stepped-up Coast Guard presence. In the earlier discussion of costs and benefit alignment, three of these reasons have already been suggested as desirable features of a Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. Here, it 14 will also be noted that reason number two also likely holds attractiveness for agencylevel planners within the Coast Guard and DoD.
Criteria for Evaluating Cost-Alignment Options
This next section discusses the criteria that will be used in this paper to evaluate cost-alignment alternatives for a Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. The suitability, acceptability, feasibility test for strategy validity described by the U. S. Army War
College's J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. 21 provides a framework that evaluates specific criteria useful in this case. Thus, Arctic cost-alignment options will be examined as follows. Suitability: Will the option succeed in achieving its end, defined as a wellaligned funding arrangement that is stable enough to support Coast Guard operations and investment?; Acceptability: Is the option politically possible or attractive to stakeholders given actual or perceived costs and benefits?; and Feasibility: Does the option provide suitable means to cover the anticipated costs? For each criterion, options will be evaluated on a descriptive scale: very good, good, medium, or poor.
Evaluation of Cost-alignment Options
To review, the specific intent of these cost-alignment options is to shift some of the costs of the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy to the oil industry -specifically, the costs involved in maintaining an added Coast Guard operational presence in the Arctic, plus the costs of the early development of a basic shore-based maritime Arctic infrastructure.
The combined annual costs are assumed to be $58.5 million per year for evaluation purposes. 22 Four different options will be evaluated: Option #1: funds are used from the Suitability: This option has medium suitability. If the regularity with which the Coast Guard already receives money from the fund is any measure, it could prove to be a very stable and reliable source of funds. 23 However, this option does not align costs as well as other options. The OSLTF is supplied by a tax on the entire oil industry; therefore, oil companies not operating in the Arctic would shoulder much of the cost.
This option would align the costs of the Coast Guard's Arctic strategy to the oil industry in general -but not sufficiently to Arctic oil production.
Acceptability: This option has good acceptability. The oil industry generally approves of OSLTF expenditures that support oil spill and prevention. However, the industry would also be wary of increased expenditures that could weaken the fund's ability to cover large spill costs. 24 Also, the Coast Guard might be indifferent to the notion of asking for more funds from the OSLTF if it expected its budget to be decreased proportionally somewhere else as a result. 25 Since federal budget rules require shifts in appropriated funds to comport with the overall federal budget's projected top line, it could be determined that the Coast Guard itself would have to "donate" an offset as a consequence of receiving more funds from an established trust fund. Were policymakers to pursue this OSLTF option, a carefully crafted appropriation might be required to perpetuate the intent that the Coast Guard's budget should not be reduced elsewhere as a result of receiving more OSLTF dollars. Another hurdle to acceptability is the OSLTF's authorizing language, which limits annual disbursements for Coast Guard operations to $25 million. A legislative change would be required to raise this ceiling.
Feasibility: This option has very good feasibility. The OSLTF is expected to nearly double in size to $4.5 billion in the next six years 26 due to oil tax increases already due to go into effect through 2017. 27 Unless circumstances affected the fund in a very negative manner, or unless Congress chose not to extend the tax past 2017, there would likely be adequate funds available to support Arctic cost-alignment.
Option #2: A New Arctic Trust Fund Supplied by Oil Royalties and Fees
This option involves creating a new trust fund supplied by revenues that Arctic oil companies already expect to pay the federal government. These include rents for production locations, royalty payments based on levels of production, and other fees. Suitability: This option has very good suitability. It offers very close costalignment since revenues are directly tied to Arctic oil production. As a funding source, such payments should prove to be steady enough to support Coast Guard Arctic costalignment. As an analog, the State of Alaska finds oil revenues a stable enough source of revenue to fund the overwhelming majority of its state budget. 29 One consideration is that royalty payments are not made to the government until after production begins.
Therefore, other fees, such as portions of permits fees would have to cover costs before production began.
Acceptability: This option has good acceptability. Oil companies would likely not oppose diverting such revenues to a new trust fund, because they already expect to pay these costs to the government on existing and future leases. 30 As most these funds are destined for the general federal treasury anyway, it is unlikely that groups would oppose some specific programming of a portion of these future funds to support the Coast Guard in the Arctic. It remains unclear whether the "newly created" status of the fund would help the Coast Guard argue against having to find its own budgetary offset (as discussed with the OSLTF).
Feasibility: This option has good feasibility. While future annual production levels of the offshore Arctic (and associated royalty revenues) are yet unknown, it stands as a fact that Shell has already paid over $2 billion in permitting fees to operate in the Chukchi Sea alone. 31 Should oil companies overcome challenges posed by the remote location, the production of the estimated oil reserves in the Alaskan outer continental shelf reserves will yield significant royalty payments. The combination of royalties and permit fees would be sufficient to cover annual cost-alignment of Coast Guard operations.
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Option #3: A New Arctic Trust Fund Supplied by a New Tax on Arctic Oil Production In this option, a trust fund would be created and supplied by a new, small tax on Arctic oil production.
Suitability: This option has very good suitability. Since the tax would be new, it could be designed specifically with stability in mind. For example, each oil company drilling in the Arctic might be required to proportionately contribute to Coast Guard Arctic costs -whether its drilling operation was in the exploration or production phase.
Acceptability: This option would have poor acceptability. Oil companies would object on the grounds of fairness, insofar as they have planned their operations according to taxes and fees the government has already fixed. The oil industry, which has a strong federal lobby, would take the position that the federal government should fund its operations from these pre-agreed revenue plans. Environmental groups who oppose Arctic drilling might support such a tax if their strategies included making Arctic drilling more expensive and difficult for the oil industry. Some environmental activists do employ strategies that seek to harm target companies financially. Suitability: This option has medium to poor suitability. Since the supply of resources would be voluntary, it would be difficult to design stability of funds into the arrangement. Oil shareholders or NGO donors could change their levels of support at any time; such uncertainty could make planning difficult for government trust fund managers and agency planners. This option would deliver good cost-alignment, since donated funds would be proffered with the trust fund's intent in mind.
Acceptability: This option has medium acceptability at best. The oil industry, which has a record of working with NGOs and government agencies on projects that support the environment, would likely be interested. However, it might also be skeptical about the idea -wary about involving itself in a working group that could develop both a voice and public influence. Such a group could attain a degree of influence whether or not all of its members possessed what the oil industry might consider an informed and adequate understanding of Arctic oil development -a prospect that might not appeal to the industry. 33 Also, it might be a challenge to identify a strong enough NGO interest willing to support such an effort, materially or otherwise. NGO's that have taken a strong stand against Arctic oil drilling might not chose to partner in this manner out of concerns their involvement would look like an endorsement of Arctic drilling. 34 It would also remain to be seen whether any single NGO or group of NGOs would put enough premium on a Coast Guard presence to invest in such an effort.
Feasibility: This option has medium to poor suitability. It remains questionable whether environmental NGO's, which often operate on limited budgets, would be able to contribute sufficiently financially, and consequentially, whether the oil industry would be willing to fund the majority of such a partnership.
Recommendation
Option # 2 is recommended for further consideration as a framework for a Coast
Guard cost-alignment solution in the Arctic. A new Arctic trust fund supplied by oil royalties and other fees scores well against the criteria laid out in this paper. As a trustfund source, such fees should prove both stable and adequate in supply. Stakeholders, including environmental NGOs and oil companies, would have little to object to.
Importantly, the oil industry would not object because it has already agreed to pay such fees to the government on existing and future Arctic oil projects. Convincing congressional authorizers to create a new trust fund, and then appropriators to employ the fund in a way that made up for any required Coast Guard budgetary self-offsetting would remain important steps in carrying out this cost-alignment plan.
One might criticize this recommendation on the grounds that it recommends the use of future taxes that would already be due the federal government from the oil industry. This argument says that while such a scheme might provide better costalignment, it does not save the government any money. That is, it provides more funds to the Coast Guard, but funds that were bound for the Treasury anyway. The argument is technically true, but takes a short view of trust fund politics. The GAO points out that a trust fund, because of public expectations, "may provide some degree of political protection". 35 Accordingly, certain constituencies might grow to expect and strongly support the notion that Arctic drillers directly offset the costs of Coast Guard Arctic operations and investment. It follows that if the cost of Coast Guard Arctic operations were to rise as drilling increased, political pressure could enable legislation that required drillers to shoulder the increased costs -with higher taxes or greater royalties. In this case, actual savings to the Treasury would be realized.
Returning to implementation -after setting up such a trust fund, Congress should begin to appropriate from the fund an annual amount necessary for a Coast Guard offshore presence in the Arctic Ocean, plus funds for the development of a basic communications and shoreside maritime infrastructure. Both DHS and DoD should continue to reevaluate the Arctic's strategic importance for national and homeland security. When security or other public needs begin to rise in proportion to the oil industry's private need for the Coast Guard's presence in the Arctic, the sharing of costs should be reevaluated for fair and equitable balance. A cost and benefit alignment should be maintained between the public interest and the private entities that operate in the Arctic.
Conclusion
Better cost-alignment in the Arctic offers the potential for stronger national policy, by enhancing both the accountability, quality, and efficiency of an important regional strategy. Furthermore, by aligning Arctic revenues with development opportunities for a communications and maritime infrastructure, policymakers have an opportunity to hedge against the current DoD and DHS Arctic infrastructure investment strategy, which is rather conservative. Shifting some infrastructure development cost burden to the US Arctic's dominant private interest minimizes the public's risk of investing too early in such an infrastructure, while preserving potential benefits of not falling behind in this critical, emerging region.
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